CIA har nå offentliggjort noen av de dokumentene tidligere visepresident Cheney har vist til i sitt forsvar av waterboarding og andre tøffe avhørsmetoder. ABCs versjon, basert på de første dokumentene:
«The documents back up the Bush administration’s claims that intelligence gleaned from captured terror suspects had thwarted terrorist attacks, but the visible portions of the heavily redacted reports do not indicate whether such information was obtained as a result of controversial interrogation techniques, such as waterboarding.»
Disse dokumentene er altså for sterkt redigert til at man kan knytte informasjonen direkte til tøffe avhørsmetoder, men følgende er interessant:
«Detainee reporting has helped thwart a number of al-Qaeda plots to attack targets in the West and elsewhere. Not only have detainees reported on potential targets and techniques that al-Qaeda operational planners have considered but arrests also have disrupted attack plans in progress,» the report said. It describes how interrogations of alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed yielded information about al-Qaeda’s attempts to obtain anthrax and crash commercial airplanes into London’s Heathrow Airport. It says that other detainees, when confronted with information learned from Mohammed, revealed more about the plots and members of al-Qaeda.»
og…
«The report on detainee information says that information learned from interrogations of al-Qaeda operative Abu Zubaydah revealed plots against «targets abroad and in the United States – including the White House and other U.S. symbols.»
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed ble, som kjent, waterboardet 183 ganger, Abu Zubaydah 83.
Det er for øvrig skjedd et par hendelser i tilknyting til etterretningsverdenen de siste dagene – for eksempel melder ABC om kraftig uenighet og «a profanity-laced screaming match» mellom CIA-direktør Leon Panetta og toppfolk i Det Hvite Hus. Det mer enn antydes at Panetta og kanskje flere etterretningsledere kan være på vei ut. Uenigheten skal særlig være om justisdepartementets etterforskning av CIA-ansatte som deltok i tøffe terroristavhør.
Justisminister Eric Holder utpekte en etterforsker i går, men det er ikke tatt noen avgjørelse om evt. tiltaler. Underrapportert i norsk presse er (selvsagt) den delen der Holder slår fast at » there would be no prosecutions of CIA personnel «who acted in good faith and within the scope of the legal guidance given by» Bush administration lawyers.» Det er med andre ord IKKE de metoder Bush-administrasjonen tillot som skal undersøkes, men eventuelle tilfeller der enkeltpersoner brøt retningslinjene.
Avgjørelsen om å oppnevne en etterforsker kom på bakgrunn av en rapport fra CIAs generalinspektør helt tilbake i mai 2004, men underrapportert er også det faktum at det i hovedsak er kun to tilfeller, utført av samme person som anbefales etterforsket i denne rapporten. Dette er de beryktede »drill og pistol»-sakene. For alle de andre tilfellene konkluderer generalinspektøren imidlertid:
«For all of the instances, the allegations were disputed or too ambiguous to reach any authoritative determination regarding the facts. Thus, although these allegations are illustrative of the nature of the concerns held by individuals associated with the CTC Program and the need for clear guidance, they did not warrant separate investigations or administrative action.»
Også verdt å merke seg, er at den CIA-ansatte som er involvert i de to ovennevnte tilfellene «said he wanted Al-Nashiri to infer, based on the debriefer’s accent and the threat that he made, that he (the debriefer) was from a Middle Eastern security service that has the reputation of using such tactics. The implication was that Al-Nashiri was well aware that the Americans would do no such thing.»
Til sist er det verdt å poste dette utdraget fra 2004-rapporten, som går ganske langt i å fastslå at waterboarding reddet liv:
«Prior to the use of EITs, Abu Zubaydah provided information for [redacted] intelligence reports. Interrogators applied the waterboard to Abu Zubaydah at least 83 times during August 2002. [The report explains that each application of water is counted separately, and most of the 83 applications lasted less than ten seconds.] During the period between the end of the use of the waterboard and 30 April 2003, he provided information for approximately [redacted] intelligence reports. It is not possible to say definitively that the waterboard is the reason for Abu Zubaydah’s increased production, or if another factor, such as the length of detention, was the catalyst. Since the use of the waterboard, however, Abu Zubaydah has appeared to be cooperative.
With respect to A-Nashiri, [redacted] reported two waterboard sessions in November 2002, after which the psychologist/interrogators determined that Al-Nashiri was compliant….Because of the litany of techniques used by different interrogators over a relatively short period of time, it is difficult to identify exactly why Al-Nashiri became more willing to provide information. However, following the use of EITs, he provided information about his most current operational planning and [redacted] as opposed to the historical information he provided before the use of EITs.
On the other hand, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, an accomplished resistor, provided only a few intelligence reports prior to the use of the waterboard, and analysis of that information revealed that much of it was outdated, inaccurate, or incomplete.»